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ABSTRACT
This  paper  studies  the  implications  of  financial  market  imperfections  represented  by  a
countercyclical external finance premium and the gradual recognition of changes in the drift of
technology growth for the design of an interest rate rule. Asset price movements induced by changes
in trend growth influence balance-sheet conditions that determine the external finance premium.
Such movements are magnified when the private sector is imperfectly informed regarding the trend
growth rate of technology. The presence of financial market imperfections provides a motivation for
responding to the gap between the observed asset prices and the potential level of asset prices in
addition to responding strongly to inflation. This is because the asset price gap represents distortions
in the resource allocation induced by financial market imperfections more distinctly than inflation.
The policymaker's imperfect information about the drift of technology growth renders imprecise the
calculation of the potential and thus reduces the benefit of responding to the asset price gap. A policy
that responds to the level of asset prices which does not take into account changes in potential tends















Recent studies on asset prices and monetary policy consider the beneﬁts of allowing the
monetary authority to respond to asset prices in a monetary policy rule.1 These studies
frequently rely on two key assumptions: (1) asset price movements create distortions in
economic activity through their eﬀect on the ability of managers to ﬁnance investment;
and (2) there exist exogenous “bubbles” or non-fundamental asset price movements.2 In
such environments, non-fundamental increases in asset prices cause investment booms,
an increase in output above potential, and rising rates of inﬂation. In this framework, a
monetary policy that responds strongly to inﬂation is frequently found to be suﬃcient
in suppressing the undesirable consequences of these asset price ﬂuctuations. In other
words, there is no need to respond to asset prices above and beyond what is implied
by their ability to forecast inﬂation.
The notion that adopting a policy of responding strongly to inﬂation is a suﬃcient
response to bubbles rests in part on the assumption that bubbles distort the economy
by increasing managers’ ability to invest without distorting their perceptions of the
value of new investment. As Dupor (2005) emphasizes, these conclusions are tem-
pered to the extent that bubbles directly inﬂuence managerial valuations of capital.
More generally, non-fundamental movements in asset prices cause distortions in ag-
gregate demand through their inﬂuence on markups and hence inﬂation and distort
the consumption/investment decision by inﬂuencing the cost of capital. A monetary
policymaker with one instrument–the nominal interest rate–faces a trade-oﬀ between
reducing distortions owing to variation in the markup and distortions owing to vari-
a t i o n si nt h er e t u r no nc a p i t a l . I ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n t ,t h ep o l i c y m a k e rm a yﬁnd
monetary policy rules that respond to asset prices to be beneﬁcial.
While much of the literature has focused on non-fundamental movements in asset
prices, it is often recognized that asset price booms occur in conjunction with changes
in the underlying economic fundamentals (Beaudry and Portier, 2004). A case in
point is the late 1990s run-up in U.S. stock prices which was closely tied to perceived
1Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000), Gilchrist
and Leahy (2002), and Tetlow (2005) provide recent examples.
2Mishkin and White (2003) provide recent discussions of the evidence on stock market bubbles and
their role in monetary policy for the U.S. economy, while Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001)
describe the Japanese stock market boom of the late 1980s and assess the conduct of monetary policy
during this episode. Borio and Lowe (2002) discuss the relationship between ﬁnancial imbalances and
monetary policy.
2changes in trend productivity growth. Thus, a key question in the literature is whether
the monetary authority can identify the source of movements in asset prices in an
environment of technological change. As emphasized by Edge, Laubach, and Williams
(2004), it is plausible to believe that the underlying trend growth in productivity is
unknown and that both the private sector and the policymaker learn over time about
the true state of the economy. In this case, the beneﬁts of allowing the monetary
authority to respond to asset prices may depend on both the information structure of
the economy and the extent to which asset price movements distort economic activity
through the ﬁnancing mechanism described above.
To address these issues, we reconsider the design of monetary policy rules in an
environment where asset prices reﬂect expectations about underlying changes in the
trend growth rate of technology. Our economy is a standard New Keynesian framework
augmented to include ﬁnancial market imperfections through the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism described in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) (henceforth BGG).
In our framework, the private sector and the policymaker are uncertain about the
trend growth rate of technology but gradually learn over time. This learning process
is reﬂected in asset price movements. Revisions to expectations owing to learning
inﬂuence asset prices and entrepreneurial net worth. Such revisions feed back into
investment demand and are magniﬁed through the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
Our ﬁndings reinforce previous results in the literature. In the absence of ﬁnancial
frictions, a policy of responding strongly to inﬂation is suﬃcient, even in situations
where the private sector is uncertain about the true state of technology growth. In
the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, our economy shows essentially one distortion, owing
to variations in the markup, which inﬂuences input choices. Suppressing inﬂation
stabilizes the markup. Adding asset prices to the monetary policy rule is unlikely
to provide further beneﬁts, even in situations where the private sector is uninformed
about the economy’s true state of growth.
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁnancial market imperfections, a policy that responds strongly
to inﬂation eliminates much of the distortionary eﬀect of asset price movements on
economic activity. Nonetheless, with inﬂation stabilized, the economy still exhibits
signiﬁcant deviations of output from potential. By giving weight to asset prices in
the monetary policy rule, the monetary authority can improve upon these outcomes.
Stabilizing output relative to potential comes at the cost of increased volatility of
inﬂation, however. Thus, as in Dupor (2005), the monetary authority faces a trade-oﬀ
3owing to its desire to eliminate two distortions with one instrument.
Our policy analysis emphasizes the beneﬁts to responding to an asset price gap–the
gap between the observed asset prices and the potential level of asset prices that arises
in a ﬂexible-price economy without ﬁnancial market imperfections. Computing such a
gap requires the policymaker to make inferences regarding the true state of technology
growth. We can thus distinguish between situations where the monetary authority has
full information regarding underlying state of technology growth and situations where
the policymaker is learning about it over time. We can similarly distinguish between
environments where the private sector is fully informed or is learning over time.
Our results imply that the beneﬁts to responding to the asset price gap depend
on the information structure of the economy. The beneﬁts of responding to the asset
price gap are greatest when the private sector is uninformed about the economy’s true
state of growth but the policymaker is informed. At the other extreme, responding to
the asset price gap may be detrimental when the private sector is informed and the
policymaker is uninformed. In this case, the policymaker is responding to the “wrong”
asset price gap.
We also consider alternative monetary policy rules that do not require the policy-
maker to infer the state of growth of the economy. These include responding to either
asset price growth or output growth. Our ﬁndings suggest that both of these policies
are likely to do well in our environment. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that responding to
the level of asset prices, as considered in much of the previous literature, is a particu-
larly bad policy. Thus, the destabilizing eﬀects of responding to asset price movements
emphasized in previous studies may in part reﬂect the assumption that the monetary
authority responds to the level of asset prices rather than their deviation from the
potential level. If the latter is unobservable, responding to changes in asset prices is
better than responding to the level itself.
Related Literature
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Cecchetti et al. (2000), Gilchrist and Leahy
(2002), and Tetlow (2005) introduce non-fundamental bubbles into an economy and
study the beneﬁts of allowing the monetary authority to respond to asset prices. Ac-
cording to Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), a policy that implies a strong response to
inﬂation stabilizes the economy, and asset prices are only useful to the extent that they
4provide information about inﬂation and the output gap. In this environment, bubbles
are exogenous and aﬀect the economy by increasing aggregate demand through a ﬁnan-
cial accelerator mechanism. A policy that responds strongly to inﬂation is suﬃcient to
suppress this aggregate demand channel. Cecchetti et al. (2000) argue that there may
be some beneﬁt to responding to asset prices in such environments, although it is likely
to be small. This literature suggests that adopting a monetary policy rule that implies
as t r o n gp o l i c yr e s p o n s et oi n ﬂation is suﬃcient even under two situations in which
asset prices may contain a relatively large amount of information about the state of
the economy: an economy with ﬁnancial frictions; and an economy with shocks that
have a persistent impact on technology growth (Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002).
Our framework diﬀers from this analysis in two fundamental ways. First, in our
economy, deviations between asset prices and underlying cash ﬂows occur because
agents do not know the true state of technology growth but instead are learning about
it over time. Recent studies by French (2001), Roberts (2001), and Kahn and Rich
(2003) emphasize the distinction between transitory and persistent movements in the
growth rate of technology. Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2004) study the eﬀect of
learning about transitory and persistent movements in technology growth in a model-
based environment. As an example of such learning, they document that the produc-
tivity growth forecasts of professional forecasters and policymakers did not change until
1999, although the trend had shifted in the mid-1990s. They also demonstrate that
a constant-gain Kalman ﬁlter tracks well the actual forecasts of trend productivity in
the 1970s and in the 1990s made by forecasters and policy makers. Pakko (2002) and
Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2004) introduce learning with a Kalman ﬁlter to a real
business cycle (RBC) model to understand the eﬀect of changes in the trend growth
rate of technology on economic activity. Our paper is also related to Tambalotti (2003),
who considers the role of learning in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with price rigidities but no capital accumulation, and Dupor (2005), who considers an
environment where agents learn about fundamental and non-fundamental shocks to
the return on capital.
Our framework is closely related to Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2005), who allow
for learning about the trend growth rate of technology in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with price rigidities and capital accumulation. We extend their
framework by allowing both the private sector and the policymaker to learn about
the true state of technology growth. We do so in an environment where learning
5inﬂuences asset values, which feed back into real economic activity through the net
worth channel emphasized by BGG. We show that this ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism
may be enhanced in the presence of learning. This stronger feedback mechanism raises
the beneﬁt to responding to asset prices, even in an environment where the policymaker
is itself uninformed about the true state of technology growth.
Second, much of the previous literature focuses on the beneﬁts of responding to
the level of asset prices. In our framework, asset price movements would occur in the
absence of frictions in either price-setting or ﬁnancial markets. Thus, we emphasize
the importance of the monetary authority’s response to the asset price gap–the gap
between the observed asset prices and the underlying potential level of asset prices. Our
ﬁnding that responding to the growth rate of asset prices is also beneﬁcial is related
to Tetlow (2005), who compares the beneﬁt of responding to the growth rate of asset
prices relative to the level of asset prices in a robust control framework.
Our emphasis on asset price movements that are tied to fundamental changes in
the underlying trend growth rate of the economy is related to the recent literature on
the response of asset prices to news about future economic fundamentals. Barsky and
DeLong (1993) and Kiyotaki (1990) study the eﬀects of learning about the transitory
and persistent components of dividend growth on asset prices in a partial equilibrium
model. When the transitory and persistent shocks to dividend growth are not observed
separately, investors extrapolate a transitory movement in dividend growth into the
future, generating a large response in asset prices. The interest rate is ﬁx e di nt h e s e
partial equilibrium models, which helps to generate large movements in asset prices.
Kiley (2000) provides a comparison of the asset pricing implications of partial and
general equilibrium models. Asset prices may fall in response to increases in the growth
rate of technology, as real interest rates rise in general equilibrium.
In an RBC framework that allows for capital accumulation, a persistent increase
in the growth rate of technology leads to a rise in the real interest rate and decreases
in investment and asset prices. Consumption rises by a large amount due to a large
wealth eﬀect of expectations of future technology improvements (Barro and King, 1984;
Campbell, 1994; and Cochrane, 1994). Using a New Keynesian model, Gilchrist and
Leahy (2002) show that asset prices may rise rather than fall in response to a persistent
increase in the growth rate of technology. This positive response in asset prices relies on
an accommodative monetary policy that responds weakly to inﬂation. More recently,
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2005) emphasize the role of monetary policy in
6generating an asset price boom in a model with habit formation and adjustment costs
to investment growth. In their model, favorable news about future technology tends
to lower current inﬂation. As the monetary authority responds by lowering interest
rates, asset prices rise. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) consider RBC environments that
may produce asset price booms following favorable news about future technology. In
our framework, as in Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), asset prices are more likely to rise in
response to favorable news about future technology in the presence of accommodative
monetary policy, and movements in asset prices are ampliﬁed in the presence of the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
Finally, there is a rich literature emphasizing the welfare beneﬁts of monetary policy
rules in environments with imperfect information and environments that allow for
ﬁnancial frictions. Dupor (2005) and Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2005) solve a
Ramsey problem to study the characteristics of the optimal monetary policy, while
Tambalotti (2003) uses a second-order approximation to the utility function in a model
without capital. More closely related to our work, Faia and Monacelli (2005) use a
second-order approximation to the policy function in the BGG framework, and ﬁnd
that including the level of asset prices in the interest rate rule with a modest coeﬃcient
is beneﬁcial to welfare when the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is relatively small. When the
coeﬃcient on inﬂation is suﬃciently large, including asset prices in the policy rule does
not improve welfare. Although we focus on a quadratic loss function rather than formal
welfare analysis, our results imply modest beneﬁts of allowing the monetary authority
to respond to the asset price gap, even when the monetary authority is responding
strongly to inﬂation. This diﬀerence in results may be partially attributable to our
emphasis on asset price gaps rather than asset price levels as the variable in the policy
rule.3
3Our ﬁn d i n gt h a tap o l i c yw h i c hr e s p o n d st ot h eg r o w t hr a t eo fa s s e tp r i c e so rt h eg r o w t hr a t eo f
output performs well when the policy maker has imperfect information about the state of technology
growth is related to Orphanides and Williams (2002), who ﬁnd that in environments where the natural
rates are unobservable, an interest rate rule which includes changes in economic activity (which does
not require information on the natural rates) performs well.
72M o d e l
The model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a ﬁnancial acceler-
ator mechanism (BGG, 1999).4 The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism links the relative
price of capital (interpretable as asset prices), balance sheet conditions of borrowers,
the external ﬁnance premium deﬁned as the cost of external funds relative to the cost of
internal funds, and investment spending. Speciﬁcally, an unexpected increase in asset
prices–as a result of a favorable shock to productivity of the economy, for example–
increases the net worth of borrowers, decreases the external ﬁnance premium, and
increases the capital expenditures of these borrowers. In general equilibrium, the in-
crease in capital expenditures leads to a further increase in asset prices and magniﬁes
the mechanism just described. To clarify the role of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism
in the relationship between asset prices and monetary policy, the following sections also
consider a model in which the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is absent.
2.1 Structure of the Economy
We ﬁrst describe the structure of the economy, including the speciﬁcation of monetary
policy rules and the information structure. We consider the problems of households,
entrepreneurs, capital producers, and retailers in turn.
2.1.1 Households
Households consume, hold money, save in the form of a one-period riskless bond whose
nominal rate of return is known at the time of the purchase, and supply labor to the
entrepreneurs who manage the production of wholesale goods.




























4The description of the model closely follows BGG (1999) and Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci
(2006).
8where Ct is consumption, Ht is hours worked, Mt/Pt is real balances acquired in period
t and carried into period t +1 ,a n dγ, θ,a n dξ are positive parameters.












where Wt is the nominal wage for the household labor, Πt is the real dividends from
ownership of retail ﬁrms, Tt is lump-sum taxes, Bt+1 is a riskless bond held between
period t and period t +1 ,a n dRn
t is the nominal rate of return on the riskless bond
held between period t − 1 and period t.























Entrepreneurs manage the production of wholesale goods. The production of wholesale
goods uses capital constructed by capital producers and labor supplied by both house-
holds and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs purchase capital from capital goods producers,
and ﬁnance the expenditures on capital with both entrepreneurial net worth (internal
ﬁnance) and debt (external ﬁnance). We introduce ﬁnancial market imperfections that
make the cost of external funds depend on the entrepreneur’s balance-sheet condition.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. To ensure that entrepreneurs do not accumulate
enough funds to ﬁnance their expenditures on capital entirely with net worth, we as-
sume that they have a ﬁnite lifetime. In particular, we assume that each entrepreneur
survives until the next period with probability η. New entrepreneurs enter to replace
those who exit. To ensure that new entrepreneurs have some funds available when
starting out, each entrepreneur is endowed with He
t units of labor that are supplied
inelastically as a managerial input to the wholesale-good production at nominal entre-
preneurial wage We
t .
The entrepreneur starts any period t with capital Kt purchased from capital pro-
9ducers at the end of period t − 1, and produces wholesale goods Yt with labor and








The entrepreneur’s project is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, ωt,w h i c ha ﬀects
both the production of wholesale goods and the eﬀective quantity of capital held by
the entrepreneur. We assume that ωt is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and time, satisfying




where At is exogenous technology common to all the entrepreneurs. Let PW,t denote the
nominal price of wholesale goods, Qt the price of capital relative to the aggregate price
Pt to be deﬁned later, and δ the depreciation rate. The entrepreneur’s real revenue in








1−α + Qt(1 − δ)Kt
¶
.
In any period t, the entrepreneur chooses the demand for both household labor
and entrepreneurial labor to maximize proﬁts given capital Kt acquired in the previous


















At the end of period t, after the production of wholesale goods, the entrepreneur
purchases capital Kt+1 from capital producers at price Qt. The capital is used as an
input to the production of wholesale goods in period t+1. The entrepreneur ﬁnances the
purchase of capital QtKt+1 partly with net worth Nt+1 and partly by issuing nominal
debt Bt+1:




10The entrepreneur’s capital purchase decision depends on the expected rate of return
on capital and the expected marginal cost of ﬁnance. The real rate of return on capital
between period t and period t +1 , Rk
t+1, depends on the marginal proﬁtf r o mt h e
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where Y t+1 is the average wholesale good production per entrepreneur (Yt+1 = ωt+1Y t+1).
Under our assumption of Etωt+1 =1 , the expected real rate of return on capital,
EtRk







Pt+1 (1 − α)
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In the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, the marginal cost of external
funds depends on the entrepreneur’s balance-sheet condition. As in BGG, we assume
asymmetric information between borrowers (entrepreneurs) and lenders and a costly
state veriﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneurs, ωt, is private
information for the entrepreneur. To observe this, the lender must pay an auditing
cost that is a ﬁxed proportion µb of the realized gross return to capital held by the
entrepreneur: µbRk
t+1QtKt+1. The entrepreneur and the lender negotiate a ﬁnancial
contract that induces the entrepreneur to not misrepresent her earnings and minimizes
the expected auditing costs incurred by the lender. We restrict attention to ﬁnancial
contracts that are negotiated one period at a time and oﬀer lenders a payoﬀ that is
independent of aggregate risk. Under these assumptions, the optimal contract is a
standard debt with costly bankruptcy: if the entrepreneur does not default, the lender
receives a ﬁxed payment independent of the realization of the idiosyncratic shock ωt;
and if the entrepreneur defaults, the lender audits and seizes whatever it ﬁnds.
In equilibrium, the cost of external funds between period t and period t +1is
equated to the expected real rate of return on capital (7). We deﬁne the external
ﬁnance premium st as the ratio of the entrepreneur’s cost of external funds to the cost
of internal funds, where the latter is equated to the cost of funds in the absence of
















In the absence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, there is no external ﬁnance premium
(st =1 ).
The agency problem implies that the cost of external funds depends on the ﬁnancial
position of the borrowers. In particular, the external ﬁnance premium increases when







where s(·) is an increasing function for Nt+1 <Q tKt+1. The speciﬁc form of the func-
tion s(·) depends on the primitive parameters of the costly state veriﬁcation problem,
including the bankruptcy cost parameter µb and the distribution of the idiosyncratic
shock ωt.W es p e c i f yap a r a m e t r i cf o r mf o rt h ef u n c t i o ns(·) in the next section.
The aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs at the end of period t is the sum of
the equity held by entrepreneurs who survive from period t − 1 and the aggregate
entrepreneurial wage, which consists of the wage earned by the entrepreneurs surviving




























where the second line used the relation Qt−1Kt = Nt + Bt/Pt−1.
Unexpected changes in asset prices are the main source of changes in the entre-
preneurial net worth, and hence the external ﬁnance premium. Equations (6) and (7)
suggest that unexpected changes in asset prices are the main source of unexpected
changes in the real rate of return on capital–the diﬀerence between the realized rate
of return on capital in period t, Rk
t, and the rate of return on capital anticipated in
the previous period, Et−1Rk
t, where the latter is the marginal cost of external funds
between period t − 1 and t. Equation (10) in turn suggests that the main source of
12changes in the entrepreneurial net worth is unexpected movements in the real rate of
return on capital, under the calibration that the entrepreneurial wage is small.5 Fi-
nally, equation (9) implies that changes in the entrepreneurial net worth are the main
source of changes in the external ﬁnance premium. Thus, movements in asset prices
play a key role in the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
Entrepreneurs going out of business in period t consume the residual equity:
C
e












t is the aggregate consumption of the entrepreneurs who exit in period t.
Overall, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism implies that an unexpected increase
in asset prices increases the net worth of entrepreneurs and improves their balance-
sheet conditions. This in turn reduces the external ﬁnance premium, and increases
the demand for capital by these entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, the price of capital
increases further and capital producers increase the production of new capital. This
additional increase in asset prices strengthens the mechanism just described. Thus,
the countercyclical movement in the external ﬁnance premium implied by the ﬁnancial
market imperfections magniﬁes the eﬀe c t so fs h o c k st ot h ee c o n o m y .
2.1.3 Capital Producers
Capital producers use both ﬁnal goods It and existing capital Kt to construct new
capital Kt+1. They lease existing capital from the entrepreneurs. Each capital producer
operates a constant returns to scale technology for capital production φ(It/Kt)Kt,
where the function φ(·) is increasing and concave, capturing the increasing marginal
costs of capital production. The aggregate capital accumulation equation is given by






Taking the relative price of capital Qt as given, capital producers choose inputs It
and Kt to maximize proﬁts from the formation of new capital. The following ﬁrst-order
condition for the capital producer’s problem implies that investment (the demand for
5In the calibration below, we set Ω =0 ,w h i c hm a k e st h ee ﬀects of changes in the entrepreneurial
wage on net worth negligible.
13ﬁnal goods by capital producers) and the quantity of new capital increase as the relative










There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers of measure unity. Re-
tailers buy wholesale goods from entrepreneurs in a competitive manner and then
diﬀerentiate the product slightly at zero resource cost.
Let Yt(z) b et h er e t a i lg o o d ss o l db yr e t a i l e rz,a n dl e tPt(z) be its nominal price.



















Households, capital producers, and the government demand the ﬁnal goods.







As in Calvo (1983), each retailer resets price with probability (1 − v), independently
of the time elapsed since the last price adjustment. Thus, in each period, a fraction
(1 − v) of retailers reset their prices, while the remaining fraction v keeps their prices
unchanged. The real marginal cost to the retailers of producing a unit of retail goods is
the price of wholesale goods relative to the price of ﬁnal goods (PW,t/Pt). Each retailer
takes the demand curve (14) and the price of wholesale goods as given and sets the
retail price Pt(z). All retailers given a chance to reset their prices in period t choose

























where Λt,i ≡ β
iCt+i/Ct is the stochastic discount factor that the retailers take as given.










Combining equations (15) and (16) yields an expression that relates the current inﬂa-
tion to the current real marginal cost and the expected inﬂation, as described in the
Appendix.
2.1.5 Aggregate Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraint for ﬁnal goods is
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + It + Gt, (17)
where Gt is the government expenditures that we assume to be exogenous.6
2.1.6 Government






The money stock is adjusted to support the interest rate rule speciﬁed below. Lump-
sum taxes adjust to satisfy the government budget constraint.
6In the calibration below, we assume that actual resource costs to bankruptcy are negligible.
152.1.7 Technology Shock Process
The growth rate of technology has both transitory and persistent components:
lnAt − lnAt−1 = µt + εt. (19)
The persistent component of technology growth in deviation from the mean growth
rate of technology, (µt − µ), follows an AR(1) process:
(µt − µ)=ρd(µt−1 − µ)+vt. (20)









Our technology process allows for two sources of variation: shocks to the transitory
and persistent components of technology growth. We consider both the case of full
information where agents observe both shocks separately and the case of imperfect
information where agents observe the technology series, At, but cannot decompose
movements in technology growth into their respective sources.
2.1.9 Monetary Policy Rules
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy using interest rate rules. We con-
sider the following types of interest rate rules.








where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is inﬂation and Rn is the steady-state nominal interest rate on
the one-period bond. We assume that the policymaker targets zero percent inﬂation.
16Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) show that this rule with a large coeﬃcient φπ
performs well in the economy with shocks to the bubble component of asset prices as
well as shocks to technology.
Policy Rule with the Asset Price Gap In the second rule that we consider,
the monetary authority adjusts interest rates based on current inﬂation and the gap















t is the equilibrium level of asset prices in the economy without pricing and
ﬁnancial frictions.
The potential level of asset prices is computed under the information available to
the policymaker. When the policymaker has full information, we use Q∗
full,t,w h i c h
is obtained by solving a ﬂexible-price model without ﬁnancial frictions under full in-
formation. When the policymaker has imperfect information, we use Q∗
imp,t,w h i c hi s
obtained by solving a ﬂexible-price model without ﬁnancial frictions under imperfect
information.
There are two ways to construct Q∗
t from the model. In the ﬁrst, one could use
the hypothetical levels of the state variables in the frictionless economy to compute
Q∗
t. In the second, one may use the levels of the state variables in the model with
both pricing and ﬁnancial market frictions combined with the decision rule for the
frictionless economy to compute Q∗
t. Neiss and Nelson (2003) follow the ﬁrst approach,
and Woodford (2003) argues that the second approach is more realistic. We adopt the
ﬁrst procedure because it is somewhat easier to work with.
Policy Rule with the Natural Rate and the Asset Price Gap We also consider
















t+1 is the natural rate of interest that prevails between period t and period
t +1 .W e d e ﬁne the natural rate of interest as the real interest rate that supports
the eﬃcient allocation in the economy without pricing and ﬁnancial frictions. It is
17computed based on the information available to the policymaker.
Policy Rule with Asset Price Growth or Output Growth T h ep o l i c yr u l ew i t h
the asset price gap requires the policymaker to compute Q∗
t–the level of asset prices
in the ﬂexible-price economy without ﬁnancial frictions. An alternative would be to












This rule is considered in Tetlow (2005).
For comparison purposes, we also consider a monetary policy rule that includes a












where µ i st h em e a ng r o w t hr a t eo ft e c h n o l o g y .
Policy Rule with the Level of Asset Prices As another rule that does not require
the policymaker to infer the unobserved shocks and thus the potential level of asset
prices, we consider a policy rule that includes a response to the level of asset prices in












where Q is the nonstochastic steady-state level of asset prices. This rule is considered
in Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and in Faia and Monacelli (2005). This rule does
not take into account variation in the potential level of asset prices.
2.2 Filtering under Imperfect Information
Let Zt ≡ At/At−1 denote technology growth, e zt ≡ (lnZt −µ) the percentage deviation
of technology growth from the mean, and e dt ≡ (µt − µ) the percentage deviation of
the persistent component of technology growth from the mean. Then we can write the
18technology process (19) and (20) as
e zt = e dt + εt, (29)
and
e dt = ρde dt−1 + νt. (30)
Under full information, agents observe both the shock to the transitory component
of technology growth, εt, and the shock to the persistent component of technology
growth, vt. Under imperfect information, agents observe e zt, or the sum of two compo-
nents,
³
e dt + εt
´
, but do not observe the two shocks separately.
Let E[e dt|e zt,e zt−1,...] ≡ e dt|t denote the inference of agents about the current state of
the persistent component of technology growth based on the observations of current
and past technology growth. We assume that agents update inferences based on the
steady-state Kalman ﬁlter:
e dt|t = λe zt +( 1− λ)ρde dt−1|t−1, (31)
where the gain, λ,i sg i v e nb y
λ ≡




























It is straightforward to show that the gain, λ, is monotonically increasing in both
the signal-to-noise ratio, φ, and the AR(1) coeﬃcient on the persistent component of
technology growth, ρd.
Given e dt|t, the inference about the shock to the transitory component of technology
growth, εt|t ≡ E[εt|e zt,e zt−1,...],i sg i v e nb y
εt|t = e zt − e dt|t, (34)
19and the inference about the shock to the persistent component of technology growth,
vt|t ≡ E[vt|e zt,e zt−1,...],i sg i v e nb y
vt|t = e dt|t − ρde dt−1|t−1. (35)
2.2.1 Properties of the Inference under Imperfect Information
We now illustrate the properties of the inference of agents about the state of tech-
nology growth. We consider how each of the shocks to the transitory and persistent
components of technology growth aﬀects the inference of agents.7
Figure 1 presents the response to a 1% increase in the transitory component of
technology growth. The dashed line is the actual persistent component of technology
growth in deviation from the mean technology growth rate, e dt ≡ (µt−µ). The solid line
is the inferred persistent component of technology growth in deviation from the mean
growth rate, e dt|t. Although the shock considered here has no impact on the persistent
component of technology growth, agents initially interpret part of the observed changes
in technology growth to be persistent. Over time, they gradually learn that the shock
was to the transitory component of technology growth.
Figure 2 presents the eﬀect of a 1% increase in the persistent component of tech-
nology growth on both the actual and the inferred persistent component of technology
growth, e dt and e dt|t. Although the shock considered here changes the persistent compo-
nent of technology growth, agents initially interpret most of the observed increase in
technology growth to be transitory. Over time, as agents accumulate more observations
of technology growth, they gradually revise their inferences.
2.2.2 Diﬀerence in Information between the Private Sector and the Poli-
cymaker
Our framework allows us to consider the case where the policymaker has diﬀerent infor-
mation from the private sector. The case where the policymaker and the private sector
have the same information about the aggregate shocks to the economy is arguably
more realistic than the case where they have diﬀerent information. Considering the
cases where they have diﬀerent information is useful for our analysis, because in these
7The parameter values related to the shock process used in these experiments are described in the
following section.
20cases the beneﬁts or the losses from allowing a policy response to the asset price gap
or the natural rate of interest are the greatest. Speciﬁcally, as we see in later sections,
the gains from allowing the policymaker to respond to movements in the natural rate
of interest or the asset price gap are greatest when the policymaker has full informa-
tion and the private sector has imperfect information.8 Allowing the policymaker to
respond to the natural rate of interest or the asset price gap is most harmful when the
policymaker has imperfect information and the private sector has full information.
In the case where the policymaker has full information and the private sector has
imperfect information, we preclude the possibility that the latter learns more about the
realizations of the shocks to the transitory and persistent components of technology
growth by observing the former’s behavior.9 Since the policymaker’s setting of the
interest rate is aﬀected by the information it possesses, the policymaker’s information
indirectly aﬀects the behavior of the private sector through movements in the inter-
est rate that is set, however. Thus, the policymaker’s information aﬀects the private
sector’s incentives but not the inferences regarding the state of technology growth.
L i k e w i s e ,i nt h ec a s ew h e r et h ep o l i c y m a k e rh a si m p e r f e c ti n f o r m a t i o na n dt h ep r i v a t e
sector has full information, we preclude the possibility that the former learns about
the unobserved shocks to technology growth from the latter’s behavior. Thus, when
considering the case of diﬀerent information between the private sector and the poli-
cymaker, we view our results as providing a useful benchmark to assess the best- and
worst-case scenarios relative to the more realistic situation where the private sector and
the policy maker have the same information, or may learn from each other’s actions.
Allowing for learning between the private sector and the policy maker is an interesting
avenue for future research.
8As described below, we assess the beneﬁts of adopting various interest rate rules based on the
variance of inﬂation and the output gap.
9Speciﬁcally, we assume that, when the private sector solves its optimization problem, it does not
internalize the fact that the potential level of asset prices Q∗
t in the policy rule (24) and (25) and
the natural rate of interest R∗
t+1 in the policy rule (25) are functions of the realizations of the shocks
µt and εt and capital stock, where those functions are obtained by solving for the eﬃcient allocation
in the frictionless economy. Note also that the variables about which the private sector learns–the
realizations of the shocks to the transitory and persistent components of technology growth–are
exogenous and independent of the policymaker’s behavior.
213C a l i b r a t i o n
We adopt a fairly standard calibration of preferences, technology, and the price-setting
structure. The ﬁnancial sector is calibrated to conform to a simpliﬁed version of BGG.
These simpliﬁcations allow us to focus on the main distortion that is introduced by
ﬁnancial market imperfections–the introduction of a countercyclical premium on ex-
ternal funds which drives a wedge between the cost of external funds and the cost of
internal funds.
3.1 Preferences, Technology, and Price-Setting
A period in the model is a quarter. The discount factor is β =0 .984.T h e l a b o r
s h a r eo fi n c o m ei sα =2 /3. Setting γ =0 .8 implies that the labor supply elasticity
is 1/γ =1 .25. The depreciation rate is δ =0 .025. The elasticity of asset prices with









kZ)=0 .25,t h e
same as in BGG (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999).10 For the price-setting, the
steady-state markup is ε/(ε−1) = 1.1, while the probability that a producer does not
adjust prices in a given quarter is v =0 .75.
3.2 Financial Market Imperfections
When log-linearizing the model, we adopt a number of simpliﬁcations to the original
ﬁnancial sector speciﬁed in BGG. These simpliﬁc a t i o n sa l l o wu st of o c u so nt h ep r i m a r y
distortion associated with ﬁnancial market imperfections–namely, that it introduces
a time-varying countercyclical wedge between the rate of return on capital and the
rate of return on the riskless bond held by households. We assume that variations
in entrepreneurial consumption and the entrepreneurial wage are negligible and can
be ignored. We further assume that actual resource costs to bankruptcy are also
negligible. Model simulations conducted under the original BGG framework imply
that these simpliﬁcations are reasonable.
The log-linearized model then implies that there are two key ﬁnancial parameters
to choose–the steady-state leverage ratio and the elasticity of the external ﬁnance
premium with respect to leverage. The steady-state ratio of the real value of the capital
10Tetlow (2005) uses a value of 0.5641 and Faia and Monacelli (2005) use a value of 0.5 for the
parameter ηk.
22stock to the entrepreneur’s net worth is chosen so that the steady-state leverage ratio is
80% or (QK −N)/N =0 .8, which implies (QK)/N =1 .8. We also adopt a simpliﬁed







Financial market imperfections imply that the external ﬁnance premium increases when
the leverage of the borrowers increases (χ > 0). In line with the calibration adopted
by BGG, the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to leverage is set
to 5%: χ =0 .05. These parameterizations imply that the nonstochastic steady-state
level of the external ﬁnance premium is s =( QK/N)
χ =1 .0298. Increasing the level
of the steady-state leverage ratio or the size of the sensitivity parameter χ strengthens
the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. In the case of no ﬁnancial market imperfections,
χ =0 . In this case, balance sheet conditions of the entrepreneurs are irrelevant for the
cost of external funds and thus for their capital expenditure decisions.
3.3 Shock Process and Filtering
We set the mean technology growth rate at the average quarterly growth rate of total
factor productivity in the United States between 1959 and 2002: µ =0 .00427.W es e t
the standard deviation of the shock to the transitory component of technology growth
at σε =0 .01, the standard deviation of the shock to the persistent component of tech-
nology growth at σv =0 .001,a n dt h eA R ( 1 )c o e ﬃcient on the persistent component of
technology growth at ρd =0 .95. These parameter choices imply that the signal-to-noise
ratio (33) is
φ =0 .01.
The Kalman gain parameter (32) consistent with these shock parameters is11
λ =0 .06138.
11This is within the range of values used in the literature. Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2005)
use λ =0 .025 together with ρd =0 .95. Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) use λ =0 .1 together with
ρd =0 .975. Tambalotti (2003) uses ρd =0 .93 together with σv/σε =0 .08 or φ ≡ σ2
v/σ2
ε =0 .0064,
implying λ =0 .0369.
234 Impulse Responses
In this section, we report impulse response functions to technology shocks to explore
the roles of imperfect information and ﬁnancial market imperfections and their eﬀects
on output, inﬂation, asset prices, and the external ﬁnance premium. We explore the
potential beneﬁts of various monetary policy rules within this framework.
4.1 Transitory Shock to Technology Growth
We begin by examining the response of output, inﬂation, asset prices, and the external
ﬁnance premium to a transitory increase in the growth rate of technology. We consider
the model with and without the ﬁnancial accelerator, and also report the response of the
ﬂexible-price economy without the ﬁnancial accelerator. This economy is undistorted
and corresponds to our notion of the potential. We ﬁrst consider a situation where
both the private sector and the policymaker are fully informed regarding the state
of technology growth. We then consider a situation where they both have imperfect
information but learn over time according to the Kalman ﬁlter speciﬁed above.
For each model, we consider three monetary policy rules: a policy of responding
weakly to inﬂation (lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt), a policy of responding strongly to
inﬂation (lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt), and a policy rule that allows a policy response
to the asset price gap in addition to a strong response to inﬂation (lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +
2.0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t)). In the case of imperfect information for the private
sector, we assume that the monetary authority also has imperfect information so that
the interest rate rule with the asset price gap is now lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt +
1.5(lnQt−lnQ∗
imp,t),w h e r eQ∗
imp,t is the level of asset prices in the frictionless economy
under imperfect information.
4.1.1 Full Information for Both the Private Sector and the Policymaker
Figure 3 plots the response of the economy without the ﬁnancial accelerator to a
transitory increase in the growth rate of technology, when both the private sector and
the policymaker have full information. The transitory shock to technology growth
causes immediate increases in output, asset prices, and inﬂation. Along the path,
output continues to rise owing to capital accumulation, while inﬂation and asset prices
return to their initial steady-state levels. With no ﬁnancial frictions, the external
24ﬁnance premium is constant at zero.
The strength of the response of output, inﬂation, and asset prices depends on the
conduct of monetary policy. Under the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation, ex-
pected real interest rates are low relative to those implied by the ﬂexible-price economy.
As a result, asset prices are high and output is above potential. In addition, inﬂation
is above its target level of zero. The policy of responding strongly to inﬂation provides
substantial improvement. Expected real interest rates rise suﬃciently so that asset
prices and output track their potential levels implied by the frictionless economy. In
addition, the inﬂation response is dampened considerably. Because the asset price gap
is essentially zero under the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation, adding the asset
price gap to the monetary policy rule produces no change in the path of output, and
has a negligible eﬀect on inﬂation. Thus, with full information and no ﬁnancial accel-
erator, there is little, if any, gain to allowing the monetary authority to respond to the
asset price gap.
Figure 4 plots the response of the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator to the same
transitory shock to technology growth. The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes
the response of output and inﬂation because a favorable shock to technology raises asset
prices and reduces the external ﬁnance premium. This ampliﬁed response represents
distortions in the resource allocation induced by ﬁnancial market imperfections. Asset
prices and investment–variables that are closely linked to the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism–deviate from their eﬃcient levels by a larger amount in the presence of
ﬁnancial market imperfections.
In the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator, adopting a policy rule that implies
a strong response to inﬂation brings the path of inﬂation close to the target. It also
reduces the response of the external ﬁnance premium and reduces the amount of over-
investment that occurs. Nonetheless, there are still large deviations in output, asset
prices, and investment from their potential levels. A policy of responding strongly to
inﬂation is successful in decreasing the distortions arising from price rigidities, but is
not suﬃcient to eliminate the distortions arising from ﬁnancial market imperfections.
Allowing the policymaker to respond to the asset price gap further reduces the invest-
m e n td i s t o r t i o no w i n gt ot h eﬁnancial accelerator. As a result, output tracks potential
more closely. This comes at the cost of producing deﬂation and increasing inﬂation
variability, however.
254.1.2 Imperfect Information for Both the Private Sector and the Policy-
maker
Figure 5 plots the response of the economy without the ﬁnancial accelerator to a tran-
sitory shock to technology growth, when both the private sector and the policymaker
have imperfect information. For comparison purposes, the ﬁgure also shows the path
of the frictionless economy under full information (the path labeled “RBC”). With
imperfect information, agents initially give some weight to the possibility that the ob-
served increase in technology growth is persistent. An additional wealth eﬀect owning
to a perception of future technology improvements raises desired level of current con-
sumption relative to the case of full information. Also, such a perception steepens the
desired consumption proﬁle. In the frictionless economy with imperfect information
(not shown in the ﬁgure), this change in the desired consumption proﬁle is supported
by a higher expected real interest rate, and we observe a smaller response of asset
prices and investment relative to the case of full information.
With the policy that implies a weak response to inﬂation, the rise in expected real
interest rates is smaller than that in the frictionless economy, and consumption rises
sharply without inducing an oﬀsetting fall in investment. These combined eﬀects imply
a larger increase in output than what is observed in the case of full information. The
inﬂation response is also much larger in the case of imperfect information. A policy
of responding strongly to inﬂation implies an output path below the potential under
full information, but substantially smaller response in inﬂation.12 In the model with
i m p e r f e c ti n f o r m a t i o nb u tn oﬁnancial accelerator, adding the asset price gap to the
monetary policy rule again has no eﬀect on the output path and only a negligible eﬀect
on inﬂation.
In the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator (Figure 6), the policy of responding
strongly to inﬂation is again beneﬁcial, leading to reductions in the response of both the
markup and the external ﬁnance premium. The model still implies distortions owing
to the ﬁnancial accelerator, however, and as a result, there are beneﬁts to responding
to the asset price gap. Allowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset price
gap stabilizes the external ﬁnance premium and largely eliminates the over-investment
12With imperfect information, a policy of responding strongly to inﬂation implies an output path
that tracks the “potential output” path consistent with the policymaker’s belief under imperfect
information rather than that consistent with the true state of technology growth. The former (not
shown in the ﬁgure) is below the latter (the path labeled “RBC”) in this case.
26that occurs due to the ﬁnancial accelerator. Output tracks potential more closely, but
this once again occurs at the cost of increasing inﬂation variability.
Overall, the ﬁnancial accelerator has eﬀects on the external ﬁnance premium under
imperfect information that are similar to those under full information. In response to a
transitory shock, the primary eﬀect of imperfect information is to cause a consumption
boom that leads to increases in output and inﬂation. Although such a consumption
boom can also inﬂuence asset prices and investment demand, imperfect information
leads to an oﬀsetting impulse to wait to invest in response to a perceived persistent
increase in the growth rate of technology. As a result, with a policy that responds
weakly to inﬂation, the investment distortions owing to the ﬁnancial accelerator are
only slightly larger under imperfect information than under full information.13 Under
both full and imperfect information, we ﬁnd that there are beneﬁts to adopting a policy
rule that implies a strong response to inﬂation. In both cases, allowing the monetary
authority to respond to the asset price gap reduces the over-investment that occurs
because of the decline in the external ﬁnance premium. Because responding to the
asset price gap also produces deﬂation, the overall beneﬁts will depend on the relative
importance of output gap stability and inﬂation stability.
4.2 Persistent Shock to Technology Growth
We now consider the eﬀect of a persistent increase in the growth rate of technology.
We begin with the case in which both the private sector and the policymaker have full
information, and then report the results obtained under imperfect information. We
again consider policy rules that include a weak response to inﬂation, a strong response
to inﬂation, and a rule that allows the monetary authority to respond to the asset price
gap. We also report the response of the frictionless economy under full information,
which corresponds to our notion of potential when we assess economic outcomes under
alternative monetary policy rules.
4.2.1 Full Information for Both the Private Sector and the Policymaker
Figure 7 plots the response of the economy without the ﬁnancial accelerator to a persis-
tent increase in technology growth, when both the private sector and the policymaker
13This can be seen by comparing the movements in asset prices and the external ﬁnance premium
labeled “Weak” in Figure 4 and Figure 6.
27have full information. With no distortions (the path labeled “RBC”), a persistent
increase in technology growth implies a boom in consumption, but an initial fall in
investment and asset prices. Over time, investment and asset prices rise as the process
of capital accumulation takes place.
In the sticky-price model, the response of the economy again depends on the conduct
of monetary policy. Under the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation, the model
generates less of an initial reduction in investment and a stronger output response.
Inﬂation rises by 16 percentage points in this case. The policy of responding strongly
to inﬂation succeeds in dampening inﬂation and brings output in line with potential.
Investment and asset prices now fall upon impact, which eliminates the asset price
gap. Without the ﬁnancial accelerator, there is essentially no diﬀerence between the
economy’s response with and without the asset price gap in the monetary policy rule.
In the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator (Figure 8), the persistent increase in
technology growth combined with the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation causes
a sharp drop in the external ﬁnance premium, a positive response of investment, and
a substantial increase in asset prices. Asset prices rise rather than fall at the onset of
a persistent increase in technology growth in the presence of the ﬁnancial accelerator
and accommodative monetary policy. The initial inﬂation response is also larger now–
on the order of 20 percentage points. The policy of responding strongly to inﬂation
provides substantial beneﬁts in terms of the output gap and inﬂation stabilization. We
still observe movements in the external ﬁnance premium, and hence some distortions in
asset prices and investment, however. Allowing the monetary authority to respond to
the asset price gap provides modest beneﬁts in terms of further reducing the distortion
in investment spending owing to the ﬁnancial accelerator. This policy once again
produces deﬂation.
4.2.2 Imperfect Information for Both the Private Sector and the Policy-
maker
Under imperfect information, the private sector initially gives a relatively large weight
to the possibility that the observed increase in technology growth is transitory. The
initial response is thus closer to what we would observe in the case of a transitory shock
to technology growth under full information. Over time, the private sector learns that
the increase in technology growth is persistent and the economic outcomes become
28more similar to those obtained in the case of a persistent shock to technology growth
under full information.
In the economy without the ﬁnancial accelerator (Figure 9), the persistent increase
in technology growth combined with the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation again
implies a large, albeit delayed, increase in inﬂation. In addition, output is more pro-
cyclical with sticky prices than would be the case under ﬂexible prices. A policy of
responding strongly to inﬂa t i o nd a m p e n sm o v e m e n t si nt h em a r k u pa n de l i m i n a t e s
most of the movements in inﬂation. In this case, output is above true potential but
tracks the output level that would occur in the frictionless economy with imperfect
information.14
With the ﬁnancial accelerator (Figure 10), the persistent increase in technology
growth again produces a countercyclical movement in the external ﬁnance premium
that implies a large distortion in investment spending relative to the frictionless RBC
outcome. A policy of responding strongly to inﬂation reduces the size of asset price
movements and reduces but does not eliminate movements in the external ﬁnance pre-
mium. Allowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap is again
beneﬁcial. Such a policy further dampens asset price movements as well as the move-
ments in the external ﬁnance premium. Once again, such a policy produces beneﬁts in
terms of stabilizing output gap but comes at the cost of destabilizing inﬂation.
Imperfect information magniﬁes the movements in the external ﬁnance premium in
response to persistent shocks to the growth rate of technology. These magniﬁcation
eﬀects are sizeable. For example, with a policy that responds strongly to inﬂation, the
movement in the external ﬁn a n c ep r e m i u mi st w i c ea sl a r g ei nt h ec a s eo fi m p e r f e c t
information (Figure 10) relative to the case of full information (Figure 8). Because the
private sector gives a relatively low initial weight to the probability that the increase in
technology growth is persistent, imperfect information implies a series of positive shocks
to expectations regarding future economic fundamentals. Such positive surprises raise
the ex post realized rate of return on capital relative to the anticipated rate of return,
and enhance entrepreneurial net worth. These procyclical movements in net worth
imply a strong hump-shaped countercyclical response in the external ﬁnance premium
as well as a greater degree of procyclicality in asset prices than would be the case
under full information. Because the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is strengthened
14The path labeled “RBC” in Figure 9 is computed under full information.
29by imperfect information and learning on the part of the private sector, we expect that
the beneﬁts of allowing the monetary authority to respond to asset prices, particularly
in the form of reduction in the volatility of the output gap, to be greater in the case of
i m p e r f e c ti n f o r m a t i o nt h a ni nt h ec a s eo ff u l li n f o r m a t i o n . 15 We now turn to stochastic
simulations to explore this issue further.
5 Stochastic Simulations
The previous section computed impulse response functions to technology shocks under
alternative monetary policy rules. These results suggest potential beneﬁts to adopting
a policy that implies a strong response to inﬂation as well as to allowing the monetary
authority to respond to the asset price gap–the gap between the observed asset prices
and the potential level of asset prices that would occur in the ﬂexible-price economy
without ﬁnancial market imperfections. The extent of these beneﬁts depends on the
degree of ﬁnancial market imperfections and the information structure of the economy.
To further explore these issues, we now conduct stochastic simulations of the various
models considered. The stochastic simulations depend on the combined eﬀect of both
transitory and persistent shocks to technology growth. When conducting such simu-
lations, we parameterize the technology shock process in the manner described in our
calibration.
5.1 Beneﬁts of Responding Strongly to Inﬂation
We ﬁrst consider the beneﬁts to adopting a policy that responds strongly to inﬂation.
As Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) have emphasized,
most of the destabilizing eﬀects of asset price ﬂuctuations on the aggregate activity
can be eliminated using such a rule. The results emphasized in Bernanke and Gertler
(1999, 2001) are derived in an environment where exogenous movements in asset prices
(bubbles) provide an additional source of ﬂuctuations in net worth. These bubbles
15To be precise, the validity of this statement depends on the relative importance of the two types of
shocks to technology growth. As we saw in this section, in response to a persistent shock to technology
growth, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is strengthened by imperfect information on the part of
the private sector. As we saw in Section 4.1.2, in response to a transitory shock to technology growth,
the eﬀect of information structures on the strength of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is relatively
small.
30do not alter entrepreneurs’ perceptions regarding the value of new investment in their
framework, however.
In our environment, misperceptions regarding the future technology growth cause
ﬂuctuations in asset values. These misperceptions also inﬂuence investment demand.
We wish to consider whether the policy prescription of responding strongly to inﬂation
is robust to the information environment that we consider. To do so, we compare
economic outcomes under the two alternative monetary policy rules–a policy rule




n +1 .1lnπt, (37)




n +2 .0lnπt.( 3 8 )
To compute the beneﬁts of various policy rules, we use stochastic model simulations
to compute the variance of both the output gap and inﬂation, where the potential level
of output, Y ∗
full,i sd e ﬁned as the level of output that would prevail in the ﬂexible-price
economy without ﬁnancial market imperfections but with full information about the
shocks to technology growth. We also compute a loss function based on a weighted
average of the variance of the output gap and the variance of inﬂation:16
Loss =0 .5var(lnY − lnY
∗
full)+0 .5var(π). (39)
We report the results of these simulations in Table 1.
The ﬁrst two rows of Table 1 consider an environment where the private sector has
full information regarding the state of technology growth. For comparison purposes, we
provide results for the model without the ﬁnancial accelerator as well as the model with
the ﬁnancial accelerator. The variance of the output gap and inﬂation are reported in
percentage points on a quarterly basis.
Responding strongly to inﬂation provides substantial beneﬁts in both the economy
with and without the ﬁnancial accelerator. Without the ﬁnancial accelerator, moving
from a weak to strong response to inﬂation implies large reductions in the variance of
16For simplicity, we report the results only for the equal-weighted loss.
31both the output gap and inﬂation. In fact, under the policy of responding strongly to
inﬂation, the variance of the output gap is very close to zero (0.006). The variance of
inﬂation is also very small (0.044). This result is consistent with our observation from
the impulse response experiments that, in the absence of the ﬁnancial accelerator, the
sticky-price model under the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation comes very close
to reproducing the frictionless RBC outcome.
In the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator, we also see substantial beneﬁts to a
policy that responds strongly to inﬂation. Both the output gap and inﬂation volatility
are reduced with such a policy. Nonetheless, with the ﬁnancial accelerator, output gap
volatility is still signiﬁcant (0.470) relative to the baseline sticky-price model (0.006).
This ﬁnding reinforces the intuition that the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator has
two distortions–one on the markup, and one on the return on capital. A policy of
responding strongly to inﬂation does well at reducing the distortion owing to variation
in the markup, but does not eliminate the distortion on the return on capital. The
presence of this distortion causes an increase in output gap volatility.
We now consider the role of imperfect information regarding the state of technology
growth. These results are reported in the second two rows of Table 1. Imperfect
information implies an increase in the variance of the output gap and a reduction in the
variance of inﬂation.17 Under the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation, the equal-
weighted loss is actually lower with imperfect information than under full information.
Because the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation is clearly the dominant policy,
it provides the more relevant comparison, however.
With the monetary policy that responds strongly to inﬂation, in the model without
17The result that the variance of the output gap is larger under imperfect information than under
full information on the part of the private sector can be explained by the fact that, when computing
the variance of the output gap, we deﬁne the potential level of output as the level of output in the
frictionless economy with full information. Under imperfect information on the part of the private
sector, the equilibrium level of output deviates from such a full-information level. The result that
t h ev a r i a n c eo fi n ﬂation is smaller under imperfect information can be understood by considering the
strength of the wealth eﬀect of shocks to technology growth on consumption, which constitutes a large
component of the aggregate demand. Under full information, wealth eﬀect on consumption is larger
when a movement in technology growth is persistent than when it is transitory. Under imperfect
information, our calibration of the Kalman gain parameter (λ =0 .06138) implies that the private
sector initially infers that observed movements in technology growth is mostly transitory, even when
these movements are in fact generated by a shock to the persistent component of technology growth.
The overall wealth eﬀect of technology growth movements on consumption, including the eﬀects of
both transitory and persistent shocks (which occur with the same frequency), is thus smaller under
imperfect information than under full information.
32the ﬁnancial accelerator, the presence of imperfect information has only a small eﬀect
on the variance of the output gap and inﬂation. In the model with the ﬁnancial
accelerator, imperfect information leads to a large increase in output gap volatility
with very little reduction in the variance of inﬂation. As a result, with the ﬁnancial
accelerator, the loss is substantially higher under imperfect information (0.458)t h a n
under full information (0.263).
5.2 Beneﬁts of Responding to the Asset Price Gap
We now consider whether a monetary policy that allows the nominal interest rate to
respond to the asset price gap can improve upon a policy that responds to inﬂation
only.18
Because we have already shown that a policy of responding strongly to inﬂation is
beneﬁcial, we restrict our attention to the case where the monetary authority responds





n +2 .0lnπt + φQ(lnQt − lnQ
∗
t). (40)
We report results varying the coeﬃcient on the asset price gap, φQ,f r o m0.1 to 2.0.
An important question in this analysis is how to gauge the beneﬁts of one policy
relative to another. Because there is a consensus in the literature that there are sub-
stantial gains to conducting a policy that responds strongly to inﬂation, we use these
gains as the relevant benchmark. In particular, Table 2 reports the diﬀerence between
outcomes obtained from pursuing policy (40) versus the policy of responding weakly to
inﬂation (37), divided by the diﬀerence between outcomes obtained from pursuing the
policy of responding strongly to inﬂation (38) versus the policy of responding weakly
to inﬂation. For example, when computing the relative gain of adopting Policy Rule x
18Although not reported here, the output gap serves a similar role as the asset price gap: in the
presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, allowing the monetary authority to respond to changes
in the output gap in addition to responding strongly to inﬂation is beneﬁcial, especially when the
policymaker has full information. An interesting future direction of this line of research is to study
economic environments in which the asset price gap plays a diﬀerent role from the output gap.
33in terms of the equal-weighted loss, we compute
Relative gain(Policy Rule x)
=
Loss(weak inﬂation response) − Loss(Policy Rule x)
Loss(weak inﬂation response) − Loss(strong inﬂation response)
. (41)
We compute the relative gain for the reduction in output gap variance and inﬂation
variance in an analogous manner. Doing so enables us to easily summarize the results:
if the relative gain is above one, the policy in question provides gains relative to the
policy of responding strongly to inﬂation. If the relative gain is negative, the policy
in question provides outcomes that are strictly worse than those under the policy of
responding weakly to inﬂation.19
In imperfect information environments, the policymaker may not have suﬃcient
information to correctly compute the potential level of asset prices Q∗
t.W et h u sd i s t i n -
guish between cases where the policymaker can correctly assess the state of technology
growth (Q∗
t = Q∗
full,t)a n dt h ec a s ew h e r et h ep o l i c y m a k e ri n f e r si tb a s e do nc u r r e n t
and past observations of technology growth (Q∗
t = Q∗
imp,t).
When considering the beneﬁts of such rules, we distinguish between environments
where the private sector has full and imperfect information. Thus, our information
structure allows for four cases: (1) full information on the part of both the private
sector and the policymaker; (2) full information for the private sector but imperfect in-
formation for the policymaker; (3) imperfect information for the private sector and full
information for the policymaker; and (4) imperfect information for both. Within these
four cases, we report results for the model with and without the ﬁnancial accelerator.
5.2.1 Full Information for the Private Sector
We ﬁrst consider the case of full information on the part of the private sector (Table
2). The top rows of Table 2 consider the case where the policymaker also has full
information. In the sticky-price model without the ﬁnancial accelerator, the relative
19Note that we cannot directly compare the numbers for the relative gain in the case of imperfect
information for the private sector and in the case of full information for the private sector, because the
gain from moving from the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation to the policy of responding strongly
to inﬂation (the denominator in the formula to calculate the relative gain (41)) diﬀers depending on
the information structure for the private sector.
34gain is approximately unity.20 Thus, there are almost no gains to allowing the monetary
authority to respond to the asset price gap relative to the policy that responds strongly
to inﬂation. By responding strongly to inﬂation, the monetary authority succeeds in
stabilizing the markup, which is the only distortion in the economy. With the markup
stabilized, the actual path for asset prices is nearly identical to the path under ﬂexible
prices, so giving weight to the asset price gap provides almost no gain.
In contrast, in the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator, responding to the asset
price gap provides clear gains in terms of output gap stabilization–on the order of
22% when the coeﬃcient on the asset price gap is relatively large, with φQ =2 .0.
Although the policy that responds strongly to inﬂation stabilizes the markup, it does
not eliminate the distortion due to ﬁnancial market imperfections, which is reﬂected
in the deviations of asset prices from the potential level that arises in the economy
without pricing and ﬁnancial frictions. Thus, responding to the asset price gap helps
reduce distortions due to ﬁnancial market imperfections. As the coeﬃcient on the asset
price gap is increased, the variance of the output gap falls but the variance of inﬂation
rises. Based on the loss function (39), which gives equal weight on the output gap and
inﬂation, our parameterization implies a modest gain to responding to the asset price
gap, with a coeﬃcient on the asset price gap 0.1 < φQ < 1.0 minimizing this loss.
We now consider the case where the private sector has full information but the
policymaker has imperfect information. These results are reported in the bottom rows
of Table 2. In the sticky-price model without the ﬁnancial accelerator, responding to
the asset price gap is a strictly inferior policy, which leads to large increases in the
variance of the output gap and inﬂation. In this environment, the potential level of
asset prices measured by the monetary authority is no longer correct, and putting
weight on the asset price gap pushes the economy away from the frictionless RBC
outcome that is attainable under the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation. With
the ﬁnancial accelerator, there is a small gain to allowing a very weak policy response
to the asset price gap (φQ =0 .1), but a deterioration in terms of the variance of output
20To de-emphasize small diﬀerences in simulation results that may reﬂect sensitivity to a numerical
solution or a simulation error, we report the relative gains rounded to the second decimal place.
Our actual results suggest that the model exhibits an extremely small but positive gain to allowing
the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap in the case of full information and no
ﬁnancial accelerator. The relative gains are always less than 1.005, however, implying that to a ﬁrst
approximation the absolute gains to allowing the policymaker to respond to the asset price gap are
zero.
35gap and inﬂation for larger coeﬃcients. When the monetary authority has imperfect
information, it responds to the wrong measure of the asset price gap, which oﬀsets any
potential gains to be achieved relative to the policy that responds strongly to inﬂation
only.
5.2.2 Imperfect Information for the Private Sector
We now consider the case where the private sector has imperfect information (Table
3). We again begin with the case where the policymaker has full information. In the
sticky-price model without the ﬁnancial accelerator, allowing the monetary authority to
respond to the asset price gap produces a small gain in terms of reducing the variance
of the output gap. These gains are no longer present when the monetary authority
also has imperfect information, however. In the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, there are
unlikely to be signiﬁcant gains to allowing the monetary authority to respond to the
asset price gap, even in the case where the private sector has imperfect information.
In the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator, the gains to responding to the asset
price gap are substantial. If the policymaker has full information, adopting a rule that
responds to the asset price gap produces an incremental reduction in the variance of
the output gap of 50% when φQ =1 .0. Allowing the monetary authority to respond to
the asset price gap reduces the variance of the output gap, but increases the variance
of inﬂation. Overall, we see an improvement as measured by the equal-weighted loss,
however.
When the policymaker has imperfect information, the gains obtained from respond-
ing to the asset price gap are somewhat smaller than the case where it has full infor-
mation. Nonetheless, the gains are still positive and economically interesting. When
the private sector has imperfect information, output gap volatility is increased relative
to the case of full information (Table 1). Since allowing the monetary authority to
respond to the asset price gap reduces distortions arising from ﬁnancial market imper-
fections and thus reduces the output variability, the overall gains from responding to
the asset price gap are larger when the private sector has imperfect information relative
t ot h ec a s ew h e r ei th a sf u l li n f ormation. These larger gains oﬀset the loss associated
with the fact that the policymaker is responding to the “wrong” asset price gap. As a
result, when the private sector has imperfect information, allowing the policymaker to
respond to the asset price gap can be beneﬁcial even when the policymaker also has
36imperfect information.
In summary, the results from Tables 2 and 3 imply that there are gains associated
with responding to the asset price gap in the presence of distortions in the return on
capital caused by ﬁnancial market imperfections. These gains are greatest when the
private sector has imperfect information and the policymaker is fully informed about
future economic fundamentals. Nonetheless, there are also gains from responding to
the asset price gap when both the private sector and the policymaker have imperfect
information. Finally, when choosing how to respond, the policymaker faces a trade-
oﬀ–increasing the coeﬃcient on the asset price gap in the monetary policy rule reduces
output gap volatility but increases inﬂation volatility.
5.3 Eﬀects of Allowing a Policy Response to the Natural Rate
We now consider the robustness of the results in the previous subsection to allowing
the policymaker to respond to movements in the natural rate of interest.21 We consider









t+1 is the natural rate of interest that prevails between period t and period
t+1. The natural rate of interest is deﬁned here as the real interest rate that supports
the eﬃcient allocation in the economy in the absence of both the pricing and ﬁnancial
frictions. It is computed based on the information available to the policymaker. We
ﬁxt h ec o e ﬃcient on inﬂation in the policy rule at 2.0, and consider various values for
the coeﬃcient on the asset price gap, φQ.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results. Table 4 considers the case of full information
for the private sector, and Table 5 considers the case of imperfect information for the
private sector. As in Tables 2 and 3, we report the gains from adopting a policy that
implies a response to the natural rate of interest and the asset price gap as well as a
strong response to inﬂation, relative to the gains from adopting a policy of responding
strongly to inﬂation only.
When the policymaker has full information, allowing the policymaker to respond
to movements in the natural rate of interest reduces the variability of both inﬂation
21We thank Michael Woodford for suggesting this line of extension.
37and the output gap, because the policymaker in this case computes the natural rate of
interest correctly.
The eﬀects of allowing the monetary authority to respond to movements in the
natural rate of interest diﬀer greatly depending on whether the ﬁnancial accelerator
is present. Without ﬁnancial market imperfections, allowing the monetary authority
with full information to respond to movements in the natural rate of interest almost
completely eliminates the only distortion in the economy arising from the pricing fric-
tions. In this situation, allowing the policymaker to respond to the asset price gap
provides little gain. In the presence of the ﬁnancial accelerator, allowing the monetary
authority to respond to movements in the natural rate of interest tends to reduce dis-
tortions arising from both pricing and ﬁnancial frictions. This is because the natural
rate of interest is deﬁned as the rate of interest that arises in the absence of both
pricing and ﬁnancial frictions. 22 In this situation, we still observe gains from allowing
the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap, but those gains are smaller
relative to the case where the policy rule does not include a response to the natural
rate of interest.
5.4 Policy Rules That Do Not Require Inferences
Monetary policy rules that allow the policymaker to respond to the asset price gap
require inferences regarding the true state of technology growth. Because these policies
are not necessarily robust to incorrect inference on the part of the policymaker, it is also
useful to consider monetary policy rules that do not require the monetary authority to
make inferences. We consider three such rules:




n +2 .0lnπt + φY(lnYt − lnYt−1 − µ). (43)




n +2 .0lnπt + φQ(lnQt − lnQt−1). (44)
22Ad i ﬀerent deﬁnition of the natural rate of interest would lead to somewhat diﬀerent conclusions.
For instance, if one deﬁnes the natural rate of interest as the interest rate in the absence of pricing fric-
tions but in the presence ﬁnancial frictions, allowing the monetary authority to respond to movements
in the natural rate would have a smaller impact on the distortions arising from ﬁnancial frictions.




n +2 .0lnπt + φQ(lnQt − lnQ), (45)
where Q is the nonstochastic steady-state level of asset prices (Q =1under our speci-
ﬁcation of the capital adjustment cost function).
Table 6 and Table 7 report the relative gains from adopting these policy rules in
the case where the private sector has full and imperfect information respectively.
In the absence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, none of these policies provide
substantial gains relative to the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation. Policies
that respond to either output growth or asset price growth lead to an increase in the
variance of the output gap, but have little impact on the variance of inﬂation. This
is true under either full or imperfect information on the part of the private sector. In
the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation does
well at reducing variation in the markup, which is the only source of distortions. As
a consequence, there is little to be gained from adding additional variables to interest
rate rules.
In the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, policies based on either out-
put growth or asset price growth provide beneﬁts relative to the policy of responding
strongly to inﬂation. In relative terms, these beneﬁts are much larger when the private
sector has imperfect information regarding the state of technology growth. Depending
on the coeﬃcient values, these policies can do as well as policies based on the asset
price gap. Because these policies do not require the policymaker to make inferences
regarding the underlying potential of the economy, they are arguably more robust than
policies based on the asset price gap.
Finally, we consider the policy rule that includes the level of the asset prices. This
policy rule has been considered in the previous literature, but studies such as Bernanke
and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) have argued against it. Here
we conﬁrm their results, albeit for somewhat diﬀerent reasons. When the private sec-
tor has imperfect information, allowing a policy response to the level of asset prices
provides clear beneﬁts in terms of reducing output gap volatility in the model with the
ﬁnancial accelerator. It also leads, however, to a large increase in inﬂation volatility.
For coeﬃcients on the level of asset prices above 0.5,t h ei n ﬂation outcome is actually
worse than what is obtained under the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation. This
39policy does not allow the monetary authority to adjust its policy owing to movements
in asset prices that reﬂect changes in the desired level of investment spending in the
frictionless economy. Because asset prices are procyclical on average in the friction-
less economy, responding to the observed level of asset prices itself implies a strongly
countercyclical policy that leads to signiﬁcant deﬂation in expansionary environments.
This deﬂationary response can be limited by adopting a policy that responds to either
the asset price gap or the growth rate of asset prices.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper considers the design of monetary policy rule in an environment where
both the private sector and the monetary authority learn about the trend growth
rate of technology. In the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections resulting from
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, shocks to the economy that
cause increases in asset prices improve the balance sheet conditions of borrowers, reduce
the external ﬁnance premium, and amplify the response of real economic activity. This
ampliﬁcation mechanism–the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism–represents a distortion
in underlying economic activity that can only partially be eliminated by a policy of
responding strongly to inﬂation. Such a policy stabilizes inﬂation but leaves a relatively
large variability in the output gap. In this environment, because ﬂuctuations in asset
prices are closely linked to the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, allowing the monetary
authority to respond to the asset price gap–the gap between the observed asset prices
and the potential level of asset prices that arises in the frictionless economy with ﬂexible
prices and no ﬁnancial market imperfections–stabilizes the output gap but tends to
increase the variability in inﬂation.
We also show that the overall gains from allowing the monetary authority to respond
to the asset price gap are greatest when the monetary authority can correctly identify
the true state of technology growth while the private sector must infer it from past
observations of technology growth. These gains are reduced to the extent that the
monetary authority is also imperfectly informed about the state of technology growth.
We further show that policy rules which respond to either the growth rate of asset prices
o rt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fo u t p u tp r o v i d em o s to ft h eb e n e ﬁts associated with including
the asset price gap in the monetary policy rule. Because it is eﬃcient that asset
40prices ﬂuctuate in the presence of shocks to technology growth, monetary policies that
respond to the observed level of asset prices itself, and hence do not take into account
changes in the potential level of asset prices, are particularly detrimental, however.
This paper focuses on a quadratic loss function rather than formal welfare analysis
in evaluating economic outcomes under diﬀerent monetary policy rules. Thus, future
work should be oriented toward assessing the robustness of our conclusions for welfare
calculations. In addition, although learning combined with the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism increases the procyclicality in asset prices as well as the extent to which
asset prices deviate from the potential level, our underlying frictionless economy implies
a fall in asset prices in response to a persistent increase in technology growth. We are
therefore also interested in exploring the robustness of our conclusions to alternative
mechanisms that may provide a more realistic characterization of the link between asset
prices and changes in expectations or news regarding future economic fundamentals.
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44Appendix
I. Equilibrium Conditions in Normalized Variables
This section lists the equilibrium conditions for the model in terms of the normal-
ized, stationary variables.
We normalize the levels of consumption, investment, output, capital stock, and net

















Kt and Nt are determined in period t−1, and we normalize these variables by the level


































where mct ≡ PW
t /Pt is the real marginal cost.
Deﬁnition of the external ﬁnance premium:
The external ﬁnance premium is deﬁned as the ratio of the expected real rate of
return on capital (which is equal to the cost of external funds in equilibrium) to the



















Evolution of net worth:






























































Under our calibration of Ce
t =0and Gt =0 ,
yt = ct + it. (A-7)
Production function:

























































where MCt ≡ Ptmct = PW













































t is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of asset prices in the absence of ﬁnancial
frictions. Q∗
t is computed under the information available to the policymaker.















t+1 is the natural rate of interest which is deﬁned as the real interest rate that
supports the eﬃcient allocation in the economy without pricing and ﬁnancial frictions.
R∗
t+1 is computed under the information available to the policymaker.




































where Q is the nonstochastic steady-state level of asset prices.
Technology shock process:
lnZt = µt + εt,
and
(µt − µ)=ρd(µt−1 − µ)+vt,
with εt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σ2
ε) and vt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σ2
v).
II. Nonstochastic Steady State
This section lists the conditions for the nonstochastic steady state of the economy






Normalize the steady-state inﬂation at 0%:
π =1 .
We specify the capital adjustment cost function such that in the nonstochastic













Using (A-3), (A-4), and Q =1 , the nonstochastic steady-state level of the external









where the parameter χ and the steady-state ratio of capital to net worth, k/n, are
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III. Log-Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
This section lists the equilibrium conditions in terms of log deviations in the nor-
malized variables from the nonstochastic steady state.
Let e zt denote the percentage deviation in technology growth from the mean:
e zt ≡ lnZt − µ.
Consumption-savings:
−e ct = −Ete ct+1 − Ete zt+1 + e r
n
t+1 − Ete πt+1.









kZ +( 1− δ)





kZ +( 1− δ)
Ete qt+1 − e qt.
Deﬁnition of the external ﬁnance premium:
e st ≡ Ete r
k
t+1 − (e r
n
t+1 − Ete πt+1).
Determination of the external ﬁnance premium:
e st = χ(e qt + e kt+1 − e nt+1).
Evolution of net worth:














t + e nt − e zt.
50Or, using the deﬁnition of the external ﬁnance premium, Et−1e rk














(e st−1 + e r
n
t − Et−1e πt)+e nt − e zt.
Investment-Q relationship:












−(Φ00(Z − (1 − δ)) · (Z − (1 − δ)))











e yt = αe ht +( 1− α)e kt − (1 − α)e zt.
Labor market equilibrium condition:
e yt + f mct − e ct =( 1+γ)e ht.
Inﬂation:
e πt = κf mct + βEte πt+1,












Policy rule with inﬂation only:
e r
n
t+1 = φπe πt.
51Policy rule with the asset price gap:
e r
n
t+1 = φπe πt + φQ(e qt − e q
∗
t).
Policy rule with the natural rate of interest and the asset price gap:
e r
n
t+1 = e r
∗
t+1 + φπe πt + φQ(e qt − e q
∗
t).
Policy rule with output growth:
e r
n
t+1 = φπe πt + φY(e yt − e yt−1 + e zt).
Policy rule with asset price growth:
e r
n
t+1 = φπe πt + φQ(e qt − e qt−1).
Policy rule with the level of asset prices:
e r
n
t+1 = φπe πt + φQe qt.
Technology shock process:
e zt = e dt + εt,
and
e dt = ρde dt−1 + νt,
where e dt is deﬁned as
e dt ≡ (µt − µ).
IV. Solution to the Model
This section describes the solution to the model.
IV.A When the monetary policy rule does not include the asset price
gap and the natural rate of interest
52When the interest rate rule does not include the asset price gap and the natural rate
of interest, we do not need to compute the equilibrium in the frictionless economy to
characterize the equilibrium in the economy with both pricing and ﬁnancial frictions.
IV.A.1 When the private sector has full information
The solution to the model takes the form:
Xt = B1Xt−1 + B2ut, (A-13)
where




t+1; e qt; f mct;e πt; e dt],
and
ut ≡ [νt;εt].
IV.A.2 When the private sector has imperfect information
We assume certainty equivalence. The solution under imperfect information is
characterized by the same coeﬃcients, B1 and B2, as in the case of full information.




on the right-hand side of the solution




that are determined by the following
four equations. The ﬁrst speciﬁes the process of the persistent component of technology
growth:
e dt = ρde dt−1 + νt. (A-14)
The second links the observed technology growth, e zt =( e dt + εt),t ot h ei n f e r e n c e
about the persistent component of technology growth, e dt|t:
e dt|t = λ1e zt +( 1− λ1)ρde dt−1|t−1
= λ1(e dt + εt)+( 1− λ1)ρde dt−1|t−1, (A-15)
where λ1 is the Kalman gain that the private sector uses.
The third deﬁnes the inference of the private sector about the realization of the
shock to the persistent component of technology growth, νt|t:
νt|t = e dt|t − ρde dt−1|t−1. (A-16)
53The fourth deﬁnes the inference of the private sector about the realization of the
shock to the transitory component of technology growth, εt|t:
εt|t = e zt − e dt|t
=( e dt + εt) − e dt|t. (A-17)
IV.B When the monetary policy rule includes the asset price gap or
the natural rate of interest
The solution described below concerns the case where the interest rate rule includes
the natural rate of interest or the asset price gap.
IV.B.1 When both the private sector and the policymaker have full
information
The solution to the model takes the form:
Xt = B3Xt−1 + B4ut, (A-18)
where






































The variables with * denote those in the model without pricing and ﬁnancial frictions
a n dt h ev a r i a b l e sw i t h o u t*d e n o t et h o s ei nt h em o d e lw i t hb o t hf r i c t i o n s . 23
IV.B.2 When the private sector has full information and the policy-
maker has imperfect information
The solution is characterized by the same coeﬃcients, B3 and B4, as in the case
where both the private sector and the policymaker have full information. We replace
23When we compute the impulse response or conduct stochastic simulations, the shocks are common
across the model with frictions and the model without frictions: νt = ν∗
t and εt = ε∗








on the right-hand side of the solution system


























t)+( 1− λ2)ρde d
∗
t−1|t−1, (A-20)
where λ2 is the Kalman gain that the policymaker uses, and
ν
∗
t|t = e d
∗













t) − e d
∗
t|t. (A-22)
IV.B.3 When both the private sector and the policymaker have imper-
fect information
The solution is characterized by the same coeﬃcients, B3 and B4, as in the case
where both the private sector and the policymaker have full information. We replace
the unobserved variables
³





on the right-hand side of the so-
lution system (A-18) with the inferences of the private sector and the policymaker ³





that are determined by the eight equations (A-14)
to (A-17) and (A-19) to (A-22). We assume that the private sector and the policymaker
use the same Kalman gain (λ1 = λ2).
IV.B.4 When the private sector has imperfect information and the
policymaker has full information
T h es o l u t i o ni sc h a r a c t e r i z e db yt h es a m ec o e ﬃcients (B3,B 4) as in the case where





on the right-hand side of the solution system (A-18)




that are determined by the
four equations (A-14) to (A-17).
56Table 1: Beneﬁts of Responding Strongly to Inﬂation
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss
Full information for the private sector
φπ =1 .10 .431 2.811 1.621 1.923 3.022 2.473
φπ =2 .00 .006 0.044 0.025 0.470 0.056 0.263
Imperfect information for the private sector
φπ =1 .10 .579 2.103 1.341 2.247 2.265 2.256
φπ =2 .00 .099 0.028 0.063 0.870 0.045 0.458
Notes:
1. The policy rule is lnRn
t+1=lnRn+φπ lnπt.
2. Yg a p is deﬁned as (lnY −lnY ∗
full), where Y ∗
full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level
of output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned
as 0.5var(Yg a p )+0 .5var(lnπ).
57Table 2: Beneﬁts of Responding to the Asset Price Gap
(Full Information for the Private Sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss
Full information for the policymaker
φQ =0 .11 .00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.01
φQ =0 .51 .00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.01 1.04
φQ =1 .01 .00 1.00 1.00 1.13 0.98 1.03
φQ =1 .51 .01 1.00 1.00 1.17 0.95 1.02
φQ =2 .01 .01 1.00 1.00 1.22 0.92 1.02
Imperfect information for the policymaker
φQ =0 .10 .98 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.01
φQ =0 .50 .85 1.00 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.99
φQ =1 .00 .59 0.99 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.97
φQ =1 .50 .31 1.00 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.94
φQ =2 .00 .21 1.00 0.90 0.79 0.88 0.85
Notes:
1. The policy rule is lnRn
t+1=lnRn+2.0lnπt+φQ(lnQt−lnQ∗
t).
2. Yg a p is deﬁned as (lnY −lnY ∗
full),w h e r eY ∗
full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level
of output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned
as 0.5var(Yg a p )+0 .5var(lnπ).
3. A value of larger than one implies that the policy is better than the policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation. A negative value implies that the policy is worse than the policy that
responds weakly to inﬂation.
58Table 3: Beneﬁts of Responding to the Asset Price Gap
(Imperfect Information for the Private Sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss
Full information for the policymaker
φQ =0 .11 .02 1.00 1.00 1.09 1.00 1.04
φQ =0 .51 .11 0.99 1.01 1.36 1.00 1.14
φQ =1 .01 .12 0.99 1.01 1.50 0.98 1.18
φQ =1 .51 .06 0.99 1.00 1.51 0.93 1.16
φQ =2 .00 .97 0.99 0.99 1.53 0.86 1.12
Imperfect information for the policymaker
φQ =0 .10 .92 1.00 0.98 1.20 1.01 1.08
φQ =0 .50 .94 1.00 0.99 1.22 1.01 1.09
φQ =1 .00 .96 1.00 0.99 1.38 0.97 1.12
φQ =1 .50 .98 1.00 1.00 1.44 0.93 1.12
φQ =2 .00 .96 1.00 1.00 1.42 0.87 1.08
Notes:
1. The policy rule is lnRn
t+1=lnRn+2.0lnπt+φQ(lnQt−lnQ∗
t).
2. Yg a p is deﬁned as (lnY −lnY ∗
full),w h e r eY ∗
full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level
of output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned
as 0.5var(Yg a p )+0 .5var(lnπ).
3. A value of larger than one implies that the policy is better than the policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation. A negative value implies that the policy is worse than the policy that
responds weakly to inﬂation.
59Table 4: Eﬀects of Allowing a Policy Response to the Natural Rate
(Full Information for the Private Sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss
Full information for the policymaker
φQ =0 1 .02 1.02 1.02 1.09 1.02 1.04
φQ =0 .11 .02 1.02 1.02 1.11 1.02 1.05
φQ =0 .51 .02 1.02 1.02 1.16 1.01 1.05
φQ =1 .01 .02 1.02 1.02 1.20 0.98 1.05
φQ =1 .51 .02 1.02 1.02 1.23 0.94 1.03
φQ =2 .01 .02 1.02 1.02 1.25 0.88 1.00
Imperfect information for the policymaker
φQ =0 1 .01 1.01 1.01 1.08 0.97 1.03
φQ =0 .11 .00 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.01 1.02
φQ =0 .50 .87 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.00 1.01
φQ =1 .00 .61 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.98
φQ =1 .50 .40 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.94
φQ =2 .00 .12 1.01 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.87
Notes:




2. Yg a p is deﬁned as (lnY −lnY ∗
full), where Y ∗
full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level
of output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned
as 0.5var(Yg a p )+0 .5var(lnπ).
3. A value of larger than one implies that the policy is better than the policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation. A negative value implies that the policy is worse than the policy that
responds weakly to inﬂation.
60Table 5: Eﬀects of Allowing a Policy Response to the Natural Rate
(Imperfect Information for the Private Sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss
Full information for the policymaker
φQ =0 1 .04 1.01 1.01 1.27 1.01 1.11
φQ =0 .11 .10 1.00 1.02 1.32 1.01 1.13
φQ =0 .51 .16 0.99 1.03 1.44 0.99 1.16
φQ =1 .01 .13 0.99 1.02 1.49 0.95 1.16
φQ =1 .51 .04 0.99 1.00 1.51 0.89 1.13
φQ =2 .00 .96 1.00 1.00 1.51 0.83 1.09
Imperfect information for the policymaker
φQ =0 1 .01 1.01 1.01 1.19 1.02 1.09
φQ =0 .11 .03 1.01 1.02 1.26 1.02 1.11
φQ =0 .50 .98 1.01 1.01 1.39 1.00 1.15
φQ =1 .00 .98 1.01 1.01 1.39 0.95 1.12
φQ =1 .50 .99 1.01 1.01 1.42 0.90 1.10
φQ =2 .00 .99 1.01 1.01 1.43 0.86 1.08
Notes:




2. Yg a p is deﬁned as (lnY −lnY ∗
full), where Y ∗
full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level
of output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and under full information.
3. The loss is deﬁned as 0.5var(Yg a p )+0 .5var(lnπ). A value of larger than one
implies that the policy is better than the policy that responds strongly to inﬂation. A negative
value implies that the policy is worse than the policy that responds weakly to inﬂation.
61Table 6: Policy Rules That Do Not Require Inferences
(Full Information for the Private Sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss
Policy with output growth: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt + φY(lnYt − lnYt−1 − µ)
φY =0 .10 .99 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.01
φY =0 .50 .85 1.01 0.99 1.04 1.01 1.02
φY =1 .00 .57 1.00 0.95 1.04 1.01 1.02
φY =1 .50 .23 0.98 0.88 0.97 0.99 0.98
φY =2 .0 −0.05 0.94 0.81 0.83 0.95 0.91
Policy with asset price growth: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt + φQ(lnQt − lnQt−1)
φQ =0 .11 .00 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.02
φQ =0 .50 .96 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.02
φQ =1 .00 .87 1.00 0.99 1.04 1.00 1.02
φQ =1 .50 .78 1.00 0.97 1.02 1.00 1.01
φQ =2 .00 .69 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.99
Policy with the level of asset prices: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt + φQ(lnQt − lnQ)
φQ =0 .10 .99 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01
φQ =0 .50 .71 0.70 0.70 1.10 0.73 0.85
φQ =1 .00 .13 −0.01 0.00 1.05 −0.31 0.13
φQ =1 .5 −0.78 −1.57 −1.46 0.91 −1.98 −1.03
φQ =2 .0 −2.16 −3.60 −3.41 0.71 −4.18 −2.57
Notes:
1. Yg a p is deﬁned as (lnY −lnY ∗
full), where Y ∗
full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level
of output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned
as 0.5var(Yg a p )+0 .5var(lnπ).
2. A value of larger than one implies that the policy is better than the policy that
responds strongly to inﬂation. A negative value implies that the policy is worse than the
policy that responds weakly to inﬂation.
62Table 7: Policy Rules That Do Not Require Inferences
(Imperfect Information for the Private Sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss var(Yg a p ) var(lnπ) Loss
Policy with output growth: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt + φY(lnYt − lnYt−1 − µ)
φY =0 .10 .97 1.00 1.00 1.20 1.01 1.08
φY =0 .50 .90 1.01 0.99 1.40 1.02 1.16
φY =1 .00 .74 1.00 0.95 1.40 1.01 1.16
φY =1 .50 .54 0.96 0.88 1.40 0.98 1.14
φY =2 .00 .33 0.90 0.79 1.37 0.92 1.24
Policy with asset price growth: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt + φQ(lnQt − lnQt−1)
φQ =0 .10 .95 1.00 0.99 1.11 1.00 1.05
φQ =0 .50 .93 1.00 0.99 1.15 1.00 1.06
φQ =1 .00 .96 1.00 0.99 1.33 1.00 1.13
φQ =1 .50 .92 1.00 0.99 1.31 1.00 1.12
φQ =2 .00 .98 1.00 0.99 1.39 1.00 1.15
Policy with the level of asset prices: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt + φQ(lnQt − lnQ)
φQ =0 .10 .96 1.01 1.00 1.21 1.02 1.09
φQ =0 .50 .91 0.61 0.66 1.44 0.61 0.93
φQ =1 .00 .49 −0.65 −0.44 1.52 −0.80 0.09
φQ =1 .50 .13 −1.86 −1.49 1.48 −2.49 −0.97
φQ =2 .0 −0.78 −4.54 −3.83 1.30 −5.42 −2.85
Notes:
1. Yg a p is deﬁned as (lnY −lnY ∗
full) where Y ∗
full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level
of output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned
as 0.5var(Yg a p )+0 .5var(lnπ).
2. A value of larger than one implies that the policy is better than the policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation. A negative value implies that the policy is worse than the policy that
responds weakly to inﬂation.
63Figure 1: Belief Response to a Transitory Shock to Technology Growth































Note: The dashed line is the realization of the persistent component of technology growth
in percentage deviation from the mean technology growth rate: e dt≡ (µt−µ).T h e s t r a i g h t
line is the inference about the persistent component of technology growth in percentage
deviation from the mean technology growth rate: E[e dt|e zt,e zt−1,...] ≡e dt|t.
64Figure 2: Belief Response to a Persistent Shock to Technology Growth:


































Note: The dashed line is the realization of the persistent component of technology growth
in percentage deviation from the mean technology growth rate: e dt≡ (µt−µ).T h e s t r a i g h t
line is the inference about the persistent component of technology growth in percentage
deviation from the mean technology growth rate: E[e dt|e zt,e zt−1,...] ≡e dt|t.
65Figure 3: Response to a Transitory Shock to Technology Growth
(Full Information, No Financial Accelerator)








































































































































t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt, Strong: lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt,A s -
set: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t), RBC: Flexible-price model with full
information and no ﬁnancial market imperfections.
66Figure 4: Response to a Transitory Shock to Technology Growth
(Full Information, Financial Accelerator)








































































































































t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt, Strong: lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt,A s -
set: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t), RBC: Flexible-price model with full
information and no ﬁnancial market imperfections.
67Figure 5: Response to a Transitory Shock to Technology Growth
(Imperfect Information, No Financial Accelerator)








































































































































t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt, Strong: lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt,A s -
set: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t), RBC: Flexible-price model with full
information and no ﬁnancial market imperfections.
68Figure 6: Response to a Transitory Shock to Technology Growth
(Imperfect Information, Financial Accelerator)













































































































































t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt, Strong: lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt,A s -
set: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t), RBC: Flexible-price model with full
information and no ﬁnancial market imperfections.
69Figure 7: Response to a Persistent Shock to Technology Growth
(Full Information, No Financial Accelerator)







































































































































t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt, Strong: lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt,A s -
set: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t), RBC: Flexible-price model with full
information and no ﬁnancial market imperfections.
70Figure 8: Response to a Persistent Shock to Technology Growth
(Full Information, Financial Accelerator)










































































































































t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt, Strong: lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt,A s -
set: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t), RBC: Flexible-price model with full
information and no ﬁnancial market imperfections.
71Figure 9: Response to a Persistent Shock to Technology Growth
(Imperfect Information, No Financial Accelerator)







































































































































t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt, Strong: lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt,A s -
set: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t), RBC: Flexible-price model with full
information and no ﬁnancial market imperfections.
72Figure 10: Response to a Persistent Shock to Technology Growth
(Imperfect Information, Financial Accelerator)










































































































































t+1 =l n Rn +1 .1lnπt, Strong: lnRn
t+1 =l n Rn +2 .0lnπt,A s -
set: lnRn
t+1 =l nRn +2 .0lnπt +1 .5(lnQt − lnQ∗
t), RBC: Flexible-price model with full
information and no ﬁnancial market imperfections.
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